| 項目 | 資料 |
|---|
| 卷期Vol. & No. | 第15卷第1期 Vol 15 No. 1 |
| 標題Title | 績效基礎的紅利發放政策對盈餘管理的影響The Effect on Earnings Management of Bonus-Grants as Performance Incentives |
| 作者Authors | 呂瑞芳Jei-Fang Lew |
| 出版日期Publish Date | 2014-05-31 |
| 摘要Abstract | 唯有當盈餘管理能達到操縱盈餘之目的時，以盈餘績效做為獎勵基礎之紅利 發放政策方成為盈餘管理之誘因。當經理人擁有較佳紅利獎勵誘因時，更能激發經 理人從事盈餘管理行為以增加其紅利。本研究探討台灣員工分紅政策與盈餘管理之 關聯。實證結果顯示紅利作為員工績效獎勵將引發更強烈的盈餘管理動機。當紅利 發放做為績效獎勵會導致更多盈餘管理行為，因為經理人會藉由操縱盈餘以增加他 們的紅利而從中獲利。而當紅利發放政策具有績效獎勵效果時，最佳的紅利獎勵機 制應反映出這些績效獎勵所產生之盈餘管理的後果。The performance-based bonuses system motivates earnings management only if the performance measurement can be manipulated through earnings management. Managers with above bonus incentives are more likely increase the value of the bonus they receive by managing earnings. This study examines the relationship between the bonus-based compensation of employees and earnings management. The empirical results show that granting bonus as a performance incentive leads to more aggressive earnings management. While bonus-grants as incentives of performance can managers get benefit from manipulating earnings reports to increase the value of the bonuses they receive. Therefore, while bonus-based compensation have positive effects on aligning incentives, the optimal bonus compensation system should reflects the consequences of earnings management arising from these performance incentives. |
| 關鍵字KeyWords | 員工分紅,盈餘管理,聯立方程式employee bonus, earnings management, simultaneous equation |
| DOI(全文下載Download) | 10.6675/JCA.2014.15.1.03 |
| 相關文章Related Articles | |