| 摘要Abstract | Lev (1992) 指出本益比反映投資人對公司相對成長潛力之認知，本益 比發生變動或是公司本益比與產業平均數存在持續性差異，即顯示公司價值 有錯誤評價之可能。因此本文以本益比發生變動作為管理者面臨資訊問題之 情境，研究目的在探討本益比變動公司的盈餘管理特性與後果：是用以顯露 私有資訊，促使股價理性反應公司經濟實質，或是投機性地管理盈餘而減低 會計盈餘為公司績效衡量的可靠性。實證結果顯示，首次出現本益比下降的 公司，管理者會利用應計會計制度之裁量權，增加會計盈餘的持續性與價值 攸關性，符合訊息發放性盈餘管理行為之預測，而且盈餘品質的提昇，使市 場對會計盈餘的錯誤訂價現象亦較為減緩。相對地，首次出現本益比上升的 公司，其盈餘管理特性則截然相反：降低會計盈餘的持續性與價值攸關性， 並且未能減緩會計盈餘被錯誤評估的程度。Change in Price-Earnings (PE) ratio over time will suggest to managers the possibility of misvaluation. The study investigates the characteristics and consequences of the discretionary accruals of the sample firms with changes in PE ratios, if managerial discretion improves the ability of earnings to reflect economic value or is opportunistic and value-irrelevant. The results show that the discretionary accruals have higher implications of one-year-ahead earnings, larger coefficients of earnings valuation, and lower mispricing for sample firms whose PE ratios decline after 3 consecutive years of growth. However, there is an opposite characteristic for sample firms whose PE ratios increase after 3 consecutive years of declining (hereafter 3D firms). The discretionary accruals significantly reduce the persistence and value relevance of earnings for 3D firms. Furthermore, the market still misprices the discretionary accruals of 3D firms. |